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Abstract: We study episodes where economic growth decelerates to negative rates. 
While the majority of these episodes are of short duration, a substantial fraction last 
for a longer period of time than can be explained as the result of business-cycle 
dynamics. The duration, depth and associated output loss of these episodes differs 
dramatically across regions.  We investigate the factors associated with the entry of 
countries into these episodes as well as their duration.  We find that while countries 
fall into crises for multiple reasons, including wars, export collapses, sudden stops 
and political transitions, most of these variables do not help predict the duration of 
crises episodes.  In contrast, we find that a measure of the density of a country’s 
export product space is significantly associated with lower crisis duration.  We also 
find that unconditional and conditional hazard rates are decreasing in time, a fact that 
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  According to the 2006 World Development Indicators, no developed economy 
attained its peak per capita GDP before 2000.  By contrast, 53 percent (61 out of 116) of 
developing economies saw their best times before that year. Of these, more than 40% 
(26) saw their best peak GDP before 1980.  This number is even higher in particular 
regions of the developing world: in Latin America, 56% (15/27) economies saw peak 
output before 2000, while in sub-Saharan Africa the corresponding figure is 74% (25/34). 
  Recessions in the developing world are much deeper and longer than in the 
developed world.  Figure 1 presents histograms of peak-trough ratios and duration of 
output contractions for developing and developed countries.
2 The comparisons are 
striking.  87.8% of recessions in the developed world have peak/trough ratios less than 
5% of peak GDP. The remaining 12.2% have peak-trough ratios between 5 and 15% of 
peak GDP.  For developing countries, the corresponding figures are 48.3% and 25.4%, 
with the remaining 26.3% having contractions where the peak-trough ratio exceeds 15% 
of peak GDP.  In terms of duration, 88.9% of recessions in developed economies last less 
than 4 years. In the developing world, the corresponding figure is 63.6%. 
  The phenomenon of deep and prolonged recessions constitutes a challenge to 
macroeconomic theory.  At the very least, it suggest that a vision of economic 
fluctuations as trends around a stable and growing level of potential GDP is problematic 
for understanding growth in the developing world. It also suggests that understanding the 
causes of low frequency fluctuations may be key for accounting for differences in 
development performance. 
  Guillermo Calvo has been one of the pioneers of the study of deep recessions in 
developing economies.  In a series of seminal papers,
3 Calvo and his coauthors have 
strived to achieve a complete characterization of a specific type of economic contraction: 
output collapses that occur in the context of sudden stops in capital flows in developing 
economies that are highly integrated into world financial markets.   Among their most 
important conclusions are that these output collapses tend to be followed by rapid 
recoveries of output despite the lack of recoveries of either domestic or foreign credit. 
  Our paper goes one step further and attempts to tackle a broader question. Instead 
of focusing on particular types of output collapses, we ask what can be learned from 
studying the distribution of economic contractions across countries and over time. In 
other words, we investigate whether it is possible to go beyond the aggregate 
characterization shown in Figure 1 to a deeper understanding of the causes behind 
prolonged recessions. In this paper we will study both the events that coincide with the 
onset of crises and the determinants of the duration of crises. Among our main results, we 
find that a number of events – wars, export collapses, sudden stops in capital flows and 
high levels of inflation – coincide with the onset of crises.  However, we find that the 
duration of crises is particularly difficult to predict.  Aside from region and time-specific 
effects, we find that a measure of the density of a country’s product space, which may 
capture the flexibility of the economy to adapt to external shocks, is an important 
predictor of crisis recovery. We also find that both conditional and unconditional hazard 
                                                 
2 The formal definition of these concepts will be introduced in section 3. 
3 Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004), Calvo, Izquierdo and Koo-Lung(2005), Calvo (2005), Calvo, 
Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006). rates are declining in time, suggesting that countries have a harder time exiting crises the 




Francis Galton once criticized his colleague statisticians because they “limited 
their inquiries to averages, and do not seem to revel in more comprehensive views.” 
(1889, p. 62).  Sir Galton could have been just as well been referring to modern growth 
empirics.  Ever since Barro’s (1989) seminal contribution, empirical work on economic 
growth has to a great extent been concerned with explaining differences in average 
growth among countries.  Despite Pritchett’s (1998) call to think closely about the “hills, 
plateaus, mountains and plains” characterizing the growth data, very little work had been 
carried out until recently attempting to explain the substantial differences in patterns 
taken by growth series with similar first and second moments.
4 
  Among the notable exceptions is the work of Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004), 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2005) and Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006).  These 
authors have concentrated in studying the characteristics of output collapses that are 
associated with “sudden stops” in capital flows in emerging market economies.  They 
have found that some of these sudden stops – particularly those associated with systemic 
international capital market turmoil – are followed by rapid recoveries arising from the 
rapid reconstruction of credit markets.   
  By concentrating on a very specific form of output collapses, Calvo and his 
coauthors have been able to take advantages of the similarities between comparable 
episodes.  Other works in this literature have taken a more general approach, attempting 
to exploit the differences arising in broader samples.  Ben-David and Papell (1998), for 
example, study episodes of growth slowdowns, defined by statistically significant breaks 
in the time series trends, and find differences between the magnitude and timing of these 
slowdowns among developed and developing countries. Pritchett (2000), in contrast, 
studied declines of at least 2 percentage points in trend growth rate – without 
distinguishing between significant or insignificant trends. Neither of these papers make 
serious attempts to understand the causes behind the onset or magnitude of growth 
slowdowns. 
  Two recent papers have made a more direct attempt to understand the dynamics 
of growth decelerations. Cerra and Sexena (2005) study the long-run implications of 
economic recoveries.  In essence, they show that after economic contractions GDP 
growth does not typically return to trend growth. Additionally, they show that the 
incidence of crises is an important reason for unconditional divergence in the postwar 
growth data.
5  Reddy and Miniou (2006) study “real income stagnations”, which they 
define as long and sustained periods of negative growth.  Their definition is perhaps the 
one that comes closest to ours in the literature.
6 They find that countries that suffered 
                                                 
4 An extensive literature has developed attempting to explain growth volatility. See Ramey and Ramey 
(1995), Imbs (2002) and Aghion and Banerjee (2004) for discussions. 
5 The definition of recoveries used by Cerran and Saxena differed from ours in that they deine a trough as 
any year having in which growth changes from negative to positive. In practice, this implies that they 
underestimate the length of “double dip” and “n-tuple dip” crises.   
6 Reddy and Minoiu also use the first “turning point” after a crisis to date the end of the crisis, being subject 
to the same objection made above regarding the Cerra and Saxena technique. spells of real income stagnation were more likely to be poor, located in Latin America or 
Africa, undergoing armed conflict and with high dependence on primary exports.
7 The 
main characteristics of these and other studies dealing with long-run economic 
contractions are summarized in Table 1. 
  One common feature of all these studies is the lack of any explicit method to deal 
with unfinished episodes of contraction. Of the nine papers listed in Table 1, four take an 
explicit decision to omit or truncate the contraction episodes; two additional ones (Ben-
David and Pappell, 1998 and Pritchett, 2000) adopt a methodology that is incapable of 
handling these breaks, thus also dropping them in practice. A sixth paper (Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Talvi, 2006) adopts a very restrictive definition of crises – drops in 
aggregate output that occur in the context of systemic capital market turmoil – with the 
result that recoveries are very rapid and in their main sample there are no episodes of 
unfinished crises.  This decision comes at a cost: there is no obvious reason from growth 
theory why one should concentrate on aggregate instead of per capita or per worker 
output.   The two remaining papers analyze the change in growth rates among two 
predetermined periods and thus do not have to deal directly with this issue.  In those 
papers, the issue of unfinished crises is avoided at the cost choosing an arbitrary cut-off 
date to calculate changes in growth rates. 
The issue of dealing with unfinished episodes is important because a substantial 
number of crisis episodes have generally not finished by the end of the period for which 
continuous data is available.  Using the definition of crisis that we will adopt in this paper 
(periods of continuous negative average growth), we find that 16.07% of the events 
defined as crises are censored.  While this number may not seem large, what is 
problematic is that it is asymmetrically composed of long crises episodes. Only 4.95% 
(18/363) of crisis episodes lasting less than 5 years are censored, while 78.5% (22/28) of 
those lasting more than 24 years are censored.  To take a simple example of how this can 
affect even the most basic conclusions of research, if we had decided to drop the censored 
observations we would have calculated the mean duration of contractions to be 3.96 
years.  If we include the censored observations, we find that the mean duration is 6.05 
years.  Even this estimate is surely an underestimate of the expected duration of a crisis, 
because the real duration of censored episodes is unobserved. If we were to fit the 
simplest possible duration function – with an exponentially distributed hazard rate – to 
this data, we would estimate an expected duration of 7.21 years.  Inferences about the 
behavior of countries during crises will thus end up being automatically biased to reflect 
the performance of economies that are more successful at dealing with crises.  
The key contribution of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the duration of 
economic contractions using econometric methods that are designed explicitly to deal 
with censored observations.  These methods, broadly grouped under the labels “duration 
analysis” and “survival analysis” have gained increasing prominence in modern 
economics primarily through their application in microeconometric settings.
8 Their key 
defining characteristic is the joint use of information on duration of censored and 
uncensored episodes in derivation of the likelihood function.  Despite their obvious 
                                                 
7 Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005), in contrast, have looked at episodes during which growth 
accelerates. Their main finding is that accelerations are not well explained by macroeconomic policy 
reforms.  
8 Two useful recent surveys are Hosmer and Lemershow (1999) and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) appeal for the study of many macroeconomic phenomena, their application in 
macroeconomic analysis has been limited.  The largest proportion of papers that use 
duration analysis in macroeconomic settings study duration dependence of business 
cycles in developed countries. (Mills, 2001; Bodman, 1998; Di Venuto and Layton, 2005; 
Diebold and Rudebusch, 1990; Mudambi and Taylor, 1991; Sichel 1991). Applications to 
developing countries are scant.  One recent exception is Mora and Siotis (2005), who 
estimated a conditional duration model of recessions in a sample of 22 emerging markets. 
Their specification is limited by the small size of their sample and the fact that they 
consider only external factors.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our definition of 
crises and our data set.  Section 3 takes a first look at the summary statistics of crises.  
Section 4 examines the factors that coincide with the onset of crises, while section 5 





2.  Defining the event 
 
For the purposes of the analysis in this paper, we define a crisis as an interval that 
starts with a contraction of output per worker and ends when the value immediately 
preceding the decline is attained again. Thus a crisis that occurs between times t and t+j 
has by definition average growth rate equal to zero during that period and negative during 
the period between t  and any t+j-e for any e<j.  A crisis cannot start if the country is 
already in crisis.  In other words, if yt<yt-1 a crisis will start only if either (i) there is no yt-
j>yt-1, or, (ii) if there is a yt-j>yt-1, there is a yt-p>yt-j with p<j. 
This definition is illustrated in Figure 2.  This definition has several advantages for 
our object of study.  First, it covers a selected group of growth decelerations. In 
particular, it covers growth decelerations where growth goes from being positive (as it 
must be before reaching a peak) to being negative between t and any t+j-e.  But it doesn’t 
cover  all growth decelerations.  In particular, we wanted to exclude the growth 
decelerations that one would find natural in neoclassical growth models, such as those 
generated by convergence to the steady state.  Our definition allows us to specialize to 
episodes where growth decelerates to a negative rate. 
Our interest in negative growth rates is related to our specialization to duration 
analysis. Although episodes of negative growth are a standard area of interest of 
macroeconomics, sustained episodes of negative growth are much harder to explain. 
Although it is certainly possible to account for negative growth using a neoclassical 
model, this requires that the economy suffer strong and sustained deteriorations in its 
fundamentals that are sufficiently strong to offset the effects of technical progress for 
periods of one or more decades. Thus long, sustained episodes of negative growth are 
only consistent with very large adverse changes in fundamentals or dynamics in which 
those fundamentals are continuously deteriorating.  
In order to calculate our crisis indicator, we used GDP per person of working age –
henceforth GDPW - in constant local currency units from World Bank (2006). We use 
working age population because it is the best widely available proxy for the size of labor force, which most closely matches the concept of labor input in growth theory. We use 
local currency units because we are not interested in comparisons of levels among 
countries and differences in PPP adjustment factors across times can be arbitrary and 
have unintended consequences (see Minoiu and Reddy, 2006). 
  Our crisis definition immediately suggests several measures of crisis intensity that 
we calculate and use in the rest of the analysis.  These are: 
(i)  Duration: the number of years elapsed between the beginning and the end 
of the crisis. 
(ii)  Peak-trough ratio: the ratio between the value of GDPW immediately 
preceding the crisis and the lowest value it attains during the crisis, 
expressed as a ratio of the peak value. 
(iii)  Integral measure of years of lost output: this is the sum of all the gaps 
between peak and the GDP for each year of the crisis. More precisely, it is 
the integral above the output series and below a horizontal line drawn at 
the peak output, expressed as a fraction of peak output.  
 
3.  Collapses big and small 
 
We start out by examining the general characteristics of crises and how they vary 
across regions.  These summary statistics are presented in Table 2.  The first striking 
fact that we observe is that there is a wide dispersion of crisis characteristics in the 
world sample. The majority of crises observed do indeed appear to be of the typical 
business cycle type: the median crisis duration is just two years, while the median 
peak-trough ration and integral measure of years lost are respectively 4% and 6% of 
pre-crisis GDP. These median values, however, come from a highly skewed 
distribution. The average duration of crises, at 6.05 years, is three times as high as the 
median duration, while the mean-to median ratios of the peak-trough ratio and 
product-years lost are respectively 2.6 and 15.9. 
High dispersion of crises characteristics is also a feature of inter-regional 
variations.    Although all regions appear to be hit by some short-lived recessions, 
long-lived recessions are much more prevalent in the developing world.  Thus, while 
the mean duration of a recession in industrialized countries is only 2.52 years, in 
Latin America it is 6.88 years in Latin America and in Central and Eastern Europe it 
is 9.74 years. The median peak-to-trough ratio of a crisis, for example is six times as 
large in Africa and 29 times as large in Central and Eastern Europe as in the 
industrialized world. 
These differences are striking, but what is even more striking is that they almost 
surely underestimate the magnitude of the differences in crisis duration both around 
the world median and across regions.  The reason is a simple one, and will form the 
foundation for much of our analysis. Shorter crises are much less likely to be 
censored than long crises.  Almost by definition, the longer a crisis is the more likely 
that it will be interrupted, either by the end of the sample or by an interruption in data 
reporting.  Therefore we can never actually observe the complete duration of very 
long crises.  It is hard to exaggerate the magnitude of this difference.  In our sample, 
only 19 out of 387 crises (4.9%)  that last less than five years are censored, while 67 
of 148 crises  (45.3%) lasting more than five years are censored.  Take the example of Venezuela, whose GDP per working age population was 39.4% lower in 2004 than in 
its peak in 1970.  Even if Venezuela were to experience extremely high growth after 
2004, its crisis is likely to last considerably longer than 34 years. 
One possible mechanism for dealing with this problem would be to drop crises 
that have not ended from the sample.  As discussed in our review of the literature, this 
is the standard choice in much of the literature that has dealt with this problem.   
However, it is a highly inefficient solution, as it entails throwing out a very high 
proportion of the crises that are most interesting for our purposes: those that are very 
long.  Therefore we adopt the alternative solution in this paper, which is to use the 
estimation techniques of duration analysis (also called survival analysis in the 
biometric literature) which are explicitly designed to deal with censored duration 
times. 
The essence of duration analysis is to explicitly consider unfinished crises as 
arising out of the same distribution as finished crises.  All countries are assumed to be 
characterized by a (possibly time-dependent) probability of leaving a crisis at any 
moment of time given that they are still in the crisis state.  That probability – called 
the  hazard rate is affected by country-specific characteristics which can be 
summarized by a vector of independent variables that may include country-specific 
effects.  The behavior over time of this rate is very interesting.  If the hazard rate is 
increasing over time, it means that as time elapses, the probability that a country will 
recover to its pre-crisis GDPW level increases.  This is the type of behavior that one 
would expect if the pre-crisis level of GDPW was an equilibrium out of which the 
economy was perturbed by a temporary shock.  However, if we see that the longer an 
economy spends in a crisis the harder it is for it to get out of it – as would be implied 
by a declining hazard rate – this would suggest either that the economy suffered 
strong blows to its fundamentals – so that its steady state level of GDPW shifted 
downwards – or that it jumped to an inferior equilibrium.   
Furthermore, in the presence of positive technological change, one would always 
expect that, if enough time has elapsed after the initial shock, an economy would 
return to its pre-crisis level of GDP even if it initially suffered an adverse shock to its 
fundamentals.  The reason is that for a given level of fundamentals, the probability 
that an economy hits any level of GDPW with positive technological change must 
tend to 1 as time increases.  Declining hazard rates over the very long run would thus 
be consistent not only with an initial adverse shock but rather with continuously 
deteriorating fundamentals as may occur because of the political system’s 
endogenous reaction to the adverse shock. 
A first intuitive way to summarize the information in our data set regarding the 
characteristics of crises is thus to plot the unconditional hazard functions. These 
hazard rate estimates are plotted in Figure 1. They are derived as smoothed kernel 
density estimates of the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function and track the 
probability of exiting a crisis conditional on being in the set of countries that have not 
exited the crisis when t periods have elapsed since falling into it.        
The remarkable result that emerges from Figure 3 is that hazard rates, both within 
regions and for the world as a whole, do not appear to be increasing. Rather, they are 
either flat or decreasing over time.  Two distinct patterns appear to emerge.  The first 
one is that of industrialized countries and East Asia and the Pacific, which have two humps.  Within these groups, countries either get out of their crises quickly, or get out 
later.  Even the second group, however, tend to get out of crises much earlier than 
those of many other regions.  The rest of the regions – including the pooled world 
sample - have hazard rates which are generally flat or decreasing, although 
confidence intervals obviously become wider as one reaches higher durations. Hazard 
rates also tend to be much lower in non-industrial countries, reaffirming the 
conclusion that crises are much more likely to be of the short duration business cycle 
type in industrialized countries than in underdeveloped regions. 
The confidence intervals drawn around the unconditional region-level hazard 
rates in Figure 1 are quite wide. This is simply a reflection of the fact that very long 
crises are sufficiently rare within each region so as to make it difficult for us to 
precisely estimate the hazard rate.  In Figure 4 we show the result of pooling the 
sample of non-industrial countries and comparing it with that of industrial countries.  
The hazard rate for developing countries is clearly declining up at least to a period of 
30 years since entry into crisis.  It is also considerably lower than that of industrial 
countries.  Whereas most industrial countries have a probability higher than 20% of 
leaving the crisis during each of the first few years in it, for developing countries that 
probability stays below 10%. 
The fact that substantial interregional differences across survival functions exist 
can be tested systematically through several standard tests for equality of survivor 
functions.  These tests are reported in Table 3.  Column 1 shows the result of testing 
the null hypothesis that all regions have the same survival function. It is thus the 
statistical counterpart of Figure 3.  Column 2 tests the null that industrial countries 
have the same hazard function as developing countries, forming the statistical 
counterpart of the comparison on Figure 2.  Lastly, column 3 evaluates the null 
hypothesis that all groups of non-industrial countries have the same survival function.  
All three homogeneity hypotheses are easily rejected. The data thus indicates that 
there is substantial inter-regional heterogeneity in the recovery from adverse shocks. 
The logical question that this analysis leads us to regards the source of these 
differences across regions.  Is it a reflection of the fact that different regions are hot 
by different types of crises? Or is rather a consequence of the fact that regions differ 
in their capacity to react to adverse shocks? In order to answer these questions, we 
must understand what factors drive countries to fall into crises and what factors 
determine the duration of crises once you have entered into them.
9 These are the 
questions that we tackle in the next two sections.   
 
4.  Why do countries fall into crises? 
 
We approach the study of the determinants of crisis occurrence through the 
estimation of random effects probit regressions on a panel of countries. The basic idea 
of this specification is to allow us to understand the potential relative triggers of a 
                                                 
9 Analytically, it is important to distinguish between the causes that lead countries to fall into crises and the 
reasons that their recovery speeds differ.  Although there could be similarities between both processes – 
and crises generated by large shocks may be more difficult to get out of – they may well be very different. 
For example, in a related analysis, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have found that the causes that lead 
countries to fall into civil wars are very different from those that determine the duration of those wars. country falling into a crisis.  In essence, we investigate whether and how different 
possible instigators correlate with the incidence of the crisis.  We look at a battery of 
potential causes of crises, ranging from the “usual suspects” – natural disasters, wars, 
sudden stops, and export collapses – to other less conventional factors. 
Any exercise of this type may be subject to several types of specification bias. 
Simultaneity bias is one – though not necessarily the most important one – of them. 
Others include omitted variables, inadequacy of the linear specification, and incorrect 
assumptions about the error covariance structure. In the case of some potential 
explanatory variables – such as natural disasters - endogeneity may be less of a 
problem than some of these other biases.  We do not make an effort to search for 
appropriate instruments for all of our explanatory variables because we view our 
exercise as a primarily exploratory attempt to investigate what factors coincide with 
the onset of crises, rather than to test tightly specified causal hypotheses.  If our 
exercise is successful, it would help build a typology of crises according to the key 
factors that occur at the same time as the crisis.  
Our baseline specification will thus be: 
( ) i it it X P η β + Φ =
'         ( 9 )  
Where Pit is the probability that country i falls into a crisis at time t, Xit
 is a 
kx1 vector of conditioning variables (generally including a constant term), ηi is a 
country-specific effect, β is the kx1 vector of parameters to be estimated and Φ(.) is 
the standard normal distribution.  The random effects probit specification models ηi as 
following a N(0,σ
2) distribution. 
Note also that our event of interest is whether a country enters a crisis or not.  
According to our definition of crises, a country is obviously a candidate for entering a 
crisis only if it is not already in one.  Therefore we exclude from the sample all 
country-years in which the country is in the midst of a crisis. This decision is based 
on the fact that these country-years contain no relevant information about the process 
of entering into crises. 
Neoclassical growth theory views output collapses as arising out of adverse 
shocks that either move the steady state level of income or alter the per capita stock of 
physical and human capital.  It is thus logical to start by looking at significant 
disruptions of an economy’s productive framework that may either affect its capacity 
to convert inputs into outputs or directly affect its stock of accumulated productive 
assets.  Several candidates come to mind.  Perhaps the first two are natural disasters 
and wars. These tend to constitute large, generally exogenous shocks that generate 
significant disruptions to a society’s capacity to produce. They will also commonly 
directly affect the capital stock. The speed of some post-war recoveries is indeed a 
commonly cited observation in defense of the conditional convergence hypothesis. 
Two other potential candidates are export collapses and sudden stops in capital flows.  
The latter has been well developed in the literature, particularly through the 
pioneering work of Guillermo Calvo.  Export collapses, while much less studied, tend 
to crop up in the analysis of many episodes of collapse (see Hausmann and 
Rodríguez, 2006). 
Our data for natural disasters is drawn from the International Disaster 
Database maintained by the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and 
the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), which has information on the physical and human damage caused by 14,877 natural disasters 
that occurred between 1960 and 2006.  We define a substantial occurrence of natural 
disasters if either (i) the number of people affected by all natural disasters occurring 
in a given year is greater than 1% of the population, or (ii) the number of people 
killed by all natural disasters occurring in a given year is greater than 0,1% of the 
population. Our proxy for natural disasters will be an indicator variable that will be 1 
if there was a substantial occurrence of natural disasters in t, t-1 or t-2. 
Regarding the occurrence of wars, we draw our data from Kristian Gleditsch’s 
(2004) Expanded War Data Set which covers all inter and intrastate wars between 
and within independent states since 1816. We build an indicator variable that equals 
one if the country was involved in an interstate or civil war in t, t-1, t-2 or t-3.  We 
also build separate dummies for civil and interstate wars respectively. Declines in 
exports are measured using data on merchandise exports from World Bank (2006).  
We use the log difference in exports between t and t-5 as our indicator of an export 
performance. 
For the purposes of defining sudden stops in capital flows, we closely follow 
the definition of Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004). According to their definition, a 
sudden stop is a year-on-year decline in capital inflows containing at least one year in 
which the decline exceeded two standard deviations from its sample mean. The 
sudden stop starts when the fall exceeds one standard deviation from the sample mean 
and ends when it is above one standard deviation.  Our measure of private capital 
flows comes from World Bank (2006) and consists in private debt and non-debt 
flows. Note that our measure differs from two other measures used by Calvo, 
Izquierdo and coauthors in some of their work.  In particular, it differs from the 
Systemic Sudden Stops (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2006) measure which is given by 
the episodes of sudden stops that coincide with increases in the aggregate EMBI 
spread.  Aside from the difficulty in obtaining a measure of capital market turmoil 
relevant for non-emerging market economies, our key reason for using the broader 
category is our interest in the broader  phenomenon of declines in capital flows.  Our 
measure also differs from the definition found in Calvo et al. (2006) that combines 
falls in capital flows with output collapses. The rationale for this is quite simple: we 
are attempting to understand the capacity of sudden stops to predict output collapses, 
whereas most of the work of Calvo and coauthors is concentrated on understanding 
the dynamics of output collapses that coincide with a decline in capital flows.
10 We 
shall discuss the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of sudden stops 
below. 
Aside from these natural candidates, we try a number of additional 
explanatory variables that may be associated with the onset of crises. We measure the 
level of a country’s democracy by its score on the Polity index (Gurr et al., 2004). We 
also measure political transitions by the change over time in its polity index. We use a 
measure of the log of 1 plus the inflation rate as a proxy for macroeconomic 
instability.  We also attempt to control for a set of additional potential explanatory 
variables such as years of primary, secondary and total schooling (from Barro and 
Lee, 2004), the rule of law (ICRG, 1999), life expectancy at birth, percent of the 
                                                 
10 Another difference with our definition is that we use annual data, while Calvo and coauthors, who study 
the short-run dynamics of sudden stops, use monthly data.   population that is urban and number of telephone mainlines per capita (from World 
Bank, 2006).  All of our estimates include region and decade dummies. 
One additional variable of interest that we will study is the measure of the 
value-weighted density of the product space elaborated by Hausmann and Klinger 
(2006). This measure is designed to capture the sophistication of the goods that an 
economy could produce with its productive assets.  It is built as a weighted average of 
the sophistication of all potential export goods, where the weights are given by the 
distance between these goods and the economy’s present export basket.  The measure 
of distance in the product space is calculated based on the frequency with which 
particular good-pairs are exported by the same country, while the measure of 
sophistication is given by the average income of the countries that export that good, 
which we call PRODYjt, as originally proposed by Hausmann, Hwang  and Rodrik 
(2005).  More formally, let  the proximity between two goods in the product space be 
given by the minimum of the conditional probabilities of exporting each one of those 
goods given that you are exporting the other one:   
{ } ) | ( ), | ( min it jt jt it ijt x x p x x p = ϕ        ( 1 0 )  
where  ) | ( jt it x x p  is the probability that you have revealed comparative 
advantage in good i at time t given that you have revealed comparative advantage in 
good j at time t.  Let xcjt be an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if country c has 
a revealed comparative advantage greater than 1 in good j at time t and 0 otherwise.  
Then we can define a measure of the “option value” of a country’s unexploited export 
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open_forest thus captures the flexibility of an economy’s export basket, in that 
it measures the value of the goods that it could be producing with the inputs that it 
currently devotes to its export production.  open_forest is particularly appropriate for 
thinking about an economy’s capacity to react to adverse export shocks.  To fix ideas, 
suppose that an economy’s exports of good i were to disappear overnight.  This could 
happen, for example, as a result of the exhaustion of a natural resource, of the 
emergence of a new lower-cost supplier in international markets or as a result of the 
invention of a cheap substitute for that good. We know that this economy must shift 
resources into a new export sector.   ijt ϕ  can be interpreted as our best guess of the 
probability that that country will shift resources into good j, and  ) 1 ( cjt ijt x − ϕ  can be 
seen as our best guess of the probability that it will export a good j that it is not 
already exporting.   jt cjt ijt PRODY x ) 1 ( − ϕ  is the expected value (measured in terms of 
the sophistication of exports) from exporting that good, making open_forest the 
weighted average of that expected value over all goods that the economy currently 
exports.  In other words, open_forest reflects the expected value of an economy’s 
next best export basket if it moved out of its current basket of exports.  
To the extent that many crises are precipitated by declines in an economy’s 
key export sectors, we expect open_forest to be a good indicator of the economy’s 
flexibility in moving to a new export basket in the face of those declines.  We thus expect  open_forest to be a significant determinant of the duration of crises.   
Open_forest may also be important in stopping crises before they materialize.  The 
reason is that export declines in traditional sectors may occur at the same time as new 
sectors are moving in to absorb unused resources.  The higher the productivity of the 
newer export sectors, the less likely that the initial export collapse will cause the 
economy to enter a period of negative growth. In order to test these hypotheses, we 
will include open_forest in the probit regressions of this section as well as the 
duration regressions of the next section. 
Our baseline results are presented in Table 4.  Column 1 presents the result of 
regressing the probability of falling into crisis on the log of real GDP per working age 
population and a set of continent and time dummies.  The GDP term is negative, 
indicating that richer countries are less prone to economic crises.  However, the 
coefficient is borderline significant (p=.075) in contrast to many of the continent 
dummies, which are highly significant.  In column (2) we add the log change in real 
merchandise exports.  Its coefficient is strongly significant with the expected negative 
sign, while the coefficient on GDP becomes insignificant. The next column adds 
wars, natural disasters and sudden stops. While wars and sudden stops are highly 
significant with the expected sign, the result on natural disasters is surprising.  The 
coefficient is not even remotely close to statistical significance (p=.764) and 
furthermore has the wrong sign.  This is particularly surprising since natural disasters 
are the one variable in the data set about whose endogeneity we are less worried.  In 
order to confirm that its coefficient is not being distorted by the endogeneity of other 
explanatory variables, we reestimated the equation dropping all variables except for 
natural disasters, time and continent dummies.
11 This exercise (not shown in the 
table) still gives an insignificant, though positive, coefficient (p=.47). Column 4 adds 
three additional variables: inflation, political transitions, open_forest and the level of 
democracy.  The first two are strongly significant, open_forest  is borderline 
significant, and democracy is clearly insignificant.  All have the expected sign: 
inflation and political change are associated with greater propensity towards crises, 
while open_forest and democracy are associated with lower crisis prevalence. Wars 
now drop to borderline insignificance. This appears to be more the result of reduced 
sample size: if we reestimate the equation of column (3) for the same number of 
observations as in column 4, we get a very similar coefficient as when we include the 
additional variables (.449, t-stat=1.7).  Finally, in the last column, we drop the clearly 
insignificant natural disasters and democracy variables. The coefficient signs and 
significance tests are unaffected, with the exception of wars, which goes from 
borderline insignificance to borderline significance. Declines in merchandise exports, 
sudden stops, high inflation episodes and political transitions are strong predictors of 
the onset of crises, while wars and open forests have a weaker but still significant 
association with crisis onset. 
What can we say about the global significance of these variables?  There are 
various ways to address this question.  One is by noting that the addition of the 
                                                 
11 Because of the exogeneity of natural disasters, the estimate of this regression is a consistent estimate of 
the reduced form total effect of natural disasters on the probability of falling into crises.  This is because if 
natural disasters are truly exogenous, any correlation between it and other potential explanatory variables 
must reflect causation from the former to the latter. explanatory variables drives down the significance of the continent and time 
dummies.  All continent dummies except for South and Central Asia are significant 
and positive in column (1). Since the omitted category is industrialized countries, this 
indicates a higher unconditional probability of falling into crises for non-
industrialized countries. By column (5), those effects have disappeared – indeed, the 
South and Central Asia dummy has turned significantly negative.  It thus appears that 
our explanatory variables account for the differences between the developing and 
developed worlds in the incidence of crises.
12 
A second way to address this question is by looking at some goodness of fit 
indicators.  These are reported in the bottom two rows of Table 4. The result of this 
exercise is not as encouraging. The first column shows the percentage of crises that 
are accurately predicted by our models.  Even our most satisfactory model of column 
5 only predicts 6.11 % of crises adequately.  This is also reflected in the pseudo-R
2 
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with  Γu  and  Γ0 respectively denoting the log-likelihood of the unrestricted 
model and the model with only a constant.   p R
2  hovers between .023 and .079, 
indicating a poor capacity of the model to predict the onset of crises. 
The goodness of fit results, however, should be interpreted with caution (see 
Wooldridge, pp. 465-6 for a discussion). The timing of a crisis is likely to be a very 
uncertain event, and it would indeed be surprising if we were able to correctly predict 
it a very high number of times.  Indeed, the flip side of our incapacity to adequately 
predict the onset of crises is that the models are very good at predicting the non-
occurrence of crises.  Since the entry into a crisis is a rare event (compared to staying 
out of the crisis), almost all prediction rules are naturally going to be very 
conservative. An alternative way to ask how good our model’s predictive capacity is 
is by looking at the times that the model correctly predicts a crisis (that is, when the 
estimated probability exceeds 0.5) as a percentage of the total number of times it 
predicts a crisis. In our baseline model of column (5), this percentage is a much more 
reasonable 52.4%. 
The economic significance of our coefficient estimates can best be interpreted 
by studying the marginal effect of changes in the explanatory variables on the 
estimated probability of a crisis. These effects are displayed in Table 5, which also 
shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in each of the explanatory 
variables. By this metric, the largest single effect comes from inflation: a one 
standard deviation increase in our inflation indicator increases the probability of a 
crisis by 7.98%.  The effect of manufacturing exports, however, is also substantial: a 
one standard deviation decline in the rate of growth of manufacturing exports causes 
an increase of 5.47 percentage points in the probability of a crisis. For indicator 
variables, a more natural metric is to think of the effect of the variable changing from 
one to zero.  By this metric, a war is by far the most destructive single event, causing 
                                                 
12 This result is not an artifice of simple reduction either: running the regression of column (1) for the 
simple in column (4) gives significantly positive continent dummies for Latin America, Africa and the 
MENA region. an increase in the probability of a crisis of 13.36 percentage points.  By contrast, a 
political transition costs 9.48 percentage points and a sudden stop costs 5.54 
percentage points increase in the probability of crises. 
In section 4 we showed that there were substantial interregional differences - 
particularly between industrial and developing regions – in the characteristics of 
crises.  In Tables 5 and 6 we look at this issue more systematically by splitting the 
sample between developing economies and industrial economies.  We indeed find 
important differences in the results in the two sub-samples. Export declines, inflation, 
political transitions and open forests retain their effect in the sub-sample of 
developing countries. Curiously, wars and sudden stops lose some significance in this 
exercise – but in the case of wars the effect again seems to come from the restriction 
of the sample.  By contrast, exports, political transitions and open forests appear not 
to be relevant in industrial countries. Inflation retains strong significance, with a 
much higher absolute coefficient estimate which reflects the much smaller ranges of 
variation of this variable in developed economies.  Wars – which in the case of 
developed economies are almost always interstate conflicts such as the Gulf War – 
are also insignificant in this sub-sample. 
While these differences are certainly interesting, the evidence that the data 
generating process is fundamentally different across regions is not all that strong.  
The developed country sample is smaller so it is logical to expect broader confidence 
intervals.  All of the variables that we found to be significant in the broader sample 
have the same sign in both sub-samples and in most cases – with the notable 
exception of the inflation rate – the coefficient estimates are strikingly similar. The 
similarity of these coefficient estimates suggests that the key reason for the difference 
in the frequency of crises across regions comes not so much from differences in the 
way in which these crises are generated but rather from differences in the distribution 
of the underlying determinants.   
Another potential source of structural differences may come from the fact that 
very lengthy or costly crises may be generated by different causes from those that 
generate shorter crises  Table 7 examines this hypothesis by splitting the sample 
between short and long crises. We split these in two dimensions: crises duration of 
five years (columns 1 and 2) and crisis duration of more than 75% of the last pre-
crisis year’s GDP (columns 3 and 4).  This exercise provides some very interesting 
results.  Regardless of whether one uses the duration or the lost output splits, one is 
struck by the similarity of the coefficient estimates for exports, wars, sudden stops, 
inflation and political transitions.  There are, however, striking differences between 
the effects of open forests and the Latin America dummy across subsamples.  These 
suggest that open forests and some unobserved characteristics of Latin America  may 
not be so much a predictor of crises onset (for which its significance in the whole 
sample is at best weak) but rather of crisis duration.  The bulk of the estimates, 
however, suggest that one can get thrown into short and long crises for very similar 
reasons.  The substantial difference, therefore, may be in how one recovers from these 
crises. 
The next three tables include a series of additional robustness tests for our 
baseline specification.  Table 8 studies the effect of adopting alternative definitions of 
capital flows.  One problem with the capital flows window measure (which is discussed at length in Calvo et al. (2004)) is that the decline in capital flows may be 
caused by an increase in export capacity. In column 1 we use a measure which 
combines the decline in capital stock with the condition that imports must also have 
declined.  The coefficient on this measure, while positive, is not significantly so. This 
may be because the combination of these two criteria is very stringent.  In column 2 
we relax it by defining a sudden stop to be any decline in capital flows that coincides 
with an import decline. This measure appears to be very poorly correlated with the 
onset of crises (p=.523).  Column 3 uses a definition based on total (as opposed to 
just private) capital flows, which we measure as the sum of the trade balance and the 
decline in reserves, combined with a decline in imports. This measure does somewhat 
better, attaining borderline significance (p=.091).  If we make this last definition 
somewhat more stringent by requiring declines in total capital flows to exceed 3% of 
GDP and import declines to exceed 5% of initial import values, significance increases 
slightly (p=.051).  We have carried out a substantial number of additional tests with 
many alternative definitions, and find that, while it is certainly possible to come up 
with definitions of sudden stops that are significantly associated with the onset of 
crisis, such a conclusion is not robust to changes in the way in which we define the 
event. An additional conclusion that can be drawn out of Table 8 is that the incidence 
of our significant explanatory variables does not change with different choices of 
sudden stop indicators.  Changes in exports, political transitions, high inflation, wars 
and open_forest maintain their patterns of association with the onset of crises in all 
alternative specifications, while the coefficient on open_forest varies substantially 
across specifications.   
To this moment we have assumed that the country-specific effect ηi in 
equation (1) is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, giving rise to the random 
effects probit specification.  This assumption is of course questionable, but relaxing it 
is problematic because of the well-known incidental parameters problem. An 
alternative is to use the fixed effects logit specification, where the coefficient vector β 
can be estimated with √n-consistency.  This specification, however, is not without its 
cost.  As discussed in detail by Wooldridge (2004, p. 492) it requires the conditional 
independence of the dependent variable given the explanatory variables.  In our 
context, this implies assuming that the probability of a crisis is independent of the 
number of crises that have occurred in the past.  
Table 9 shows the results of this specification.  There are important changes as 
well as similarities with the random effects probit specification.  The key similarity 
lies in the coefficients for merchandise exports and the capital-flow window 
definition of sudden stops (which retain strong statistical significance), and wars 
(which are significant in the broader sample and borderline significant once one adds 
additional controls.  The effects of inflation and political transitions are preserved, 
although with higher p-values than under the probit specification.  The striking 
difference, however, lies in the changes in the log of per capita GDP, which is now 
strongly negative and significant – indicating that richer countries have less 
propensity to experience crises – and open_forest, which is now positively – though 
insignificantly- related to the onset of crises. 
Our last battery of robustness tests is displayed in Table 10, where we study 
the effect of adding additional potential explanatory variables to the probit specification.  In this table, we include average years of primary, secondary and total 
schooling as measures of human capital’s effect on propensity to fall in crises.       
Neither of these measures is significant (columns 1-3).  Neither is a measure of 
institutions (the rule of law), of physical infrastructure (telephone mainlines per 
capita), of urbanization, or of life expectancy. 
We can summarize the results of this section as follows.  A number of 
variables appear to be associated with the onset of crises.  In terms of robustness, the 
variable that comes out on top is the log change in merchandise exports, which has 
come out as significant in all the specifications in which it is included with the 
exception of the subsample of developed countries. In terms of economic 
significance, a one-standard deviation increase in inflation appears to be much more 
damaging than a similar increment in any other variable.     Most specifications 
coincide in a significant effect of the capital-flows window definition of sudden stops 
as well as political transitions on the probability of a crisis occurring.  The effects of 
wars, initial income and residual continent or time dummies are much more variable 
to specification.  Particularly, while open_forest comes out as a significant predictor 
in some specifications its coefficient tends to be weak and its sign is reversed in the 
conditional logit specification. 
 
5.  How do countries get out of crises?   
 
In this section we analyze the determinants of crisis duration.  Most existing 
contributions in the literature do not deal with the problem of censoring that naturally 
arises in the analysis of the duration of contractionary episodes.  As discussed in the 
introduction, the standard solution taken in the papers in the literature that address 
this issue is to drop or truncate those observations.  Either solution is inappropriate. 
Dropping the observations biases the sample towards short duration episodes, while 
truncating them inadequately represents crises as having shorter durations than they 
have. 
The results presented in this section deal with the problem of censored 
observations by adopting a duration analysis approach.  Specifically, if we have n 
countries with t1…tn crises duration, we concentrate on finding the estimate of the 
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where δi is an indicator variable that takes the value 0 if the peak per worker GDP 
has not been reached by the last observation in the sample.  Broadly speaking, there 
are two approaches in the literature to estimating (5).  One is to specify a parametric 
functional form for f(t) and to estimate the parameters of that form.  The second one 
is to use a non-parametric approach to estimation of f(t).  The latter is commonly 
associated with estimation of the Cox proportional hazards model. Although the 
nonparametric approach is more flexible, it can lead to more imprecise estimates of 
the hazard function than a correctly specified parametric form.  We will present 
versions of both models in this section.   
Another key issue has to do with how to handle country level heterogeneity in this 
framework.  For analogous reasons to those of panel data estimation with binary dependent variables, fixed effects estimators are not consistent for duration models 
(Andersen, Klein and Zhang, 1999).  Two alternative approaches exist.  One is to 
assume that countries have differing propensities to experiencing crises.  These 
propensities – called frailties– are analogous to the random effects of panel data 
models.  An alternative approach is to use the fact that in the presence of repeated 
events, the Cox proportional hazards model, parameter estimates converge to a value 
that can be interpreted meaningfully, but the estimated covariance matrix is 
inappropriate for hypothesis testing (Lin and Wei, 1989, Struthers and Kalbfleisch, 
1984).  Variance-corrected models modify the covariance matrix of the Cox model in 
order to be able to carry out appropriate tests. 
Before proceeding to the statistical tests, we start out by looking at the 
characteristics of crises according to the events associated with them.  The summary 
statistics associated with these different types of crises, as well as their associated 
unconditional hazard functions, are shown respectively in Table 11 and Figure 5.  If 
different types of crises correspond to different types of shocks, then we would expect 
that the patterns of recoveries associated with different crises would also differ.  In 
particular, this would be true if we believe that some crises triggers have non-
permanent effects on the determinants of steady state income.  As we have discussed 
previously, in this case hazard functions should be clearly increasing.  This is 
precisely the feature that Calvo and coauthors have argued characterizes some sudden 
stops of capital flows. Similarly, to the extent that the level of democracy appears to 
be irrelevant for crisis onset, political regime transitions should have a transitory 
effect on the level of income: they should create havoc during the time of the 
transition, but after they occur one would not expect there to be a permanent effect.  
What is interesting about Figure 3 is that it shows that declining hazard rates 
appear to characterize many different types of crises. Indeed, all splits appear to be 
characterized by the same overall pattern: a short initial period of increasing hazard 
rates, and a much longer period of strongly declining rates. The relative magnitudes 
are also similar across characteristics.  The one striking difference is open_forest.  
Countries with very high open forests have crises of much lower duration and 
consequently display a higher probability of exiting the crisis at any one moment. 
Recall that of the variables that we have used to carry out the splits, open_forest 
(along with natural disasters) was not robustly associated with the onset of crises.  
This figure suggests that it may be directly associated with crisis duration  
This hypothesis can be tested more systematically by looking at the effect of these 
factors in duration regressions.  We do this in the rest of the section.  We start out by 
looking at the most common parametric duration model, which is the Weibull 
distribution. Essentially, we estimate the hazard rate for country i as a function of a 
baseline hazard and the covariates: 
) exp( ) | ( 0 X v h X t h i t i β =         ( 1 4 )  
where  h0t=pt
p-1.  The parameter p characterizes the shape of the Weibull 
distribution, with p<1 corresponding to a decreasing hazard function. The νi  are the 
country-level frailty terms which are assumed to follow a Gamma distribution. 
Estimates are displayed in Table 12. 
Colum (1) shows the effect of simply running a regression of duration on log of 
per worker GDP.  The hazard specification is presented, so that a positive coefficient implies that increasing the variable in question leads to a higher probability of leaving 
the crisis.  The first surprising result is that income by itself does not appear to have 
an effect on duration.  Rather, as column (2) shows, it is other region-specific 
characteristics, aside from income differences, that are driving the key differences 
between crises duration across countries.  In column (3) we introduce open_forest 
into the regression.  We find that it is very strongly correlated with crisis duration. A 
one-standard deviation increase in open_forest implies an increase of 86.8% in the 
probability of leaving the crisis (exp(.557)*sd(open_forest)). Column (4) introduces 
controls for the level of democracy and sudden stops.  The democracy control can be 
taken as a naïve test of Rodrik’s (1997) hypothesis that countries with better 
institutions for conflict management have an easier time adjusting to negative shocks.  
Framed this way, the hypothesis does not get strong support in our data: the effect of 
democracy is not significantly related with the probability of leaving the crisis, 
though the coefficient estimate is positive. However, Rodrik’s hypothesis is 
somewhat more nuanced – see the additional results in Table 13.  Calvo and 
coauthors have suggested that the recoveries associated with some types of sudden 
stops may be associated with faster recoveries. The estimates in column (4) show that 
this is not the case for collapses in capital flows generally speaking.   
The next columns of Table 12 introduce other potential determinants of crisis 
duration.  The first logical candidates for this are the different determinants that we 
used in the probit analysis of the previous sections.  If how you fall into the crisis 
matters for post-crisis behavior, then we should expect crisis durations to differ 
significantly for crises that were initiated by different events.  We have already seen 
in Figure 3 that there is little indication of this being the case in unconditional hazard 
rates by group, but we now verify this within the framework of the parametric 
Weibull specification.  In effect, the estimates in column 4 show that different factors 
that were significantly associated with the onset of crises are not associated with 
crisis duration.  This is the case of wars, inflation, and political transitions – as well as 
of natural disasters, which did not prove significant in the probit analyses.   
One may expect that both open forests and democracy may make the society more 
capable of responding to particular types of shocks rather than uniformly increasing 
the probability of exiting all types of crises.  Open_forest, for example, should have a 
positive effect on an economy’s capacity to adapt to export collapses, while 
democracy may make societies more capable of adapting to external shocks such as 
sudden stops.  The last two columns of Table 12 evaluate these hypotheses, and find 
little support.  Neither an interaction between open forests and changes in exports nor 
the interaction term between democracy and the two external shock indicators 
(changes in exports and sudden stops) are significant.  This may of course reflect the 
relative coarseness of these multiplicative terms to capture complex nonlinearities. 
Table 13 tests a battery of additional possible correlates of crisis duration. These 
include an alternative indicator of non-systemic sudden stops in column 1 (the same 
one in column 4 of Table 8, which captures large decreases in total capital flows that 
coincide with substantial import declines),  an indicator of trade policy in (column 2), 
a measure of human capital (total years of schooling – column 3), a measure of 
financial deepening (liquid liabilities in GDP, column 4), a general measure of 
openness (trade/GDP ratio, column 5), and a measure of social modernization (life expectancy, column 6).    We also try two measures of the idea that institutions may 
have an effect on crisis duration.  The first one introduces an interaction between our 
indicator of democracy and the terms of trade shock, thus capturing the idea that 
democracies are better able to adapt to adverse terms of trade shocks.  This effect is 
insignificant. Another specification uses the interaction between the Gini index and 
one minus a scaled democracy variable.  This is closest to Rodrik’s (1997) precise 
specification.  It gets tentative support in the data, with a borderline significant 
negative coefficient. In one last specification we include the regressors of columns 1-
7 together (column 9). None of these terms are significant, while the open_forest 
indicator remains strongly significant.  
In the next table we adopt as our baseline specification a regression including 
time and region dummies, open_forest and the log of initial GDP, and we evaluate 
whether the strength of the coefficient on open forests is at all dependent on the 
parametric specification of the hazard function.  We use four alternative 
parameterizations: the exponential, the Gompertz, the log-logistic and the log-normal.   
In reading Table 14, it is important to bear in mind that the last two specifications do 
not accept a hazard rate interpretation and are thus reported in accelerated-failure time 
modes, so that the dependent variable is the duration of the crisis.  Thus a positive 
effect in the hazard representation is analogous to a negative effect in the accelerated-
failure time representation.  That is, in fact, what we find: open forest has a positive, 
significant effect in the hazard rate representations and a negative, significant effect 
in the failure time representations.  The result that open_forest decreases the time 
necessary to escape a crisis is robust to the parameterization adopted. 
Figure 6 displays the conditional hazard rates that emerge from the five 
parametric specifications that we have estimated (with the controls of Table 13). 
These are the estimated hazard rates for an observation with the expected random 
effect νi =1. In contrast to the unconditional hazard rates of Figure 2-5, they are not 
affected by the changing composition of the population and reflect the estimated 
probability that a particular country will exit the crisis. For comparison purposes, we 
also report the unconditional hazard rate of a Cox model without shared frailties.  
Except for the exponential form, which is constrained to be constant, all our estimates 
of the hazard rates again give declining functions in time.  
In the next two tables we turn towards estimation in the framework of a variance-
corrected Cox proportional hazards model.  In particular, we specialize to the 
conditional risk-set model of Prentice, Williams, and Peterson (1981, hence forth 
PWP). The basic idea of the PWP model is to stratify by event number, so that the 
conditional risk set for experiencing crisis k is the number of countries that have 
experienced k-1 crises in the past.  The model is stratified by number of crises in 
order to obtain the corrected variance estimates. Tables 15 and 16 repeat the 
estimation exercises of Tables 12 and 13 using the PWP specification.  The results are 
broadly similar. Open_forest is almost always significant, with the only exception 
being the last column of Table 15, which has a very small number of observations 
(here it has a borderline p value of .116 with 60 observations). None of the other 
potential covariates emerge as significant. 
As we have argued above, declining hazard rates may indicate the presence of 
multiple equilibria – with negative shocks leading countries to shift to inferior equilibria – or adverse permanent productivity shocks. A valid question to ask at this 
stage is whether there is evidence that this phenomenon is due to changes in 
fundamentals.  One way to tackle this question is by asking whether the “triggers” 
which appear to have sent the economy into the crisis have returned to pre-crisis 
levels at the time periods during which we are observing declining hazard rates.   
Figure 5 presents one such exercise.  In it we calculate the average paths for countries 
with crisis duration greater than or equal to ten years for five of the variables that we 
have found to be significantly associated with the onset of crises: wars, exports, 
capital flows, inflation, and political transitions.  The evidence is mixed, and thus 
interesting.  By the 10
th year of the crisis, the fraction of countries in the midst of a 
war has returned to pre-crisis levels. The number of countries undergoing political 
transitions has also declined, though not to pre-crises levels. Capital flows have 
actually gone up in comparison to their pre-crises levels.  This is interesting not only 
because it suggests that the decline in capital flows is not the cause for declining 
hazard rates but also because it is suggestive that the marginal product of capital in 
equilibrium has not gone down.  On the other hand, we find that the average inflation 
levels has gone up while the share of exports in GDP has gone down during the crisis.  
Both of these are consistent with the hypothesis that the economy enters some type of 
economic tailspin both in its export capacity and in the quality of its macroeconomic 
policy during prolonged crises. 
There are several ways in which we can interpret the strength of the open_forest 
variable.  At a general level, open_forest is an indicator of an economy’s flexibility.  
It measures the possibilities that an economy has of moving to the production of other 
goods, weighted by the sophistication of these goods.  It thus combines a hypothesis 
that flexibility is important with the hypothesis that countries develop by producing 
rich-country goods, as suggested by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003).  In Table 17 we 
use a measure of open forests that does not weigh goods by their PRODY, thus 
implicitly assigning goods equal value.  The absolute value of the coefficient and its 
significance are very similar to those obtained by open_forest. When both variables 
are introduced in the regression (not shown) neither of them is significant at 5%, 
suggesting that they are too collinear to distinguish between the alternative 
hypotheses they represent.  To the extent that pure density is a simpler explanation, 
Occam’s razor would suggest sticking with it.  Column 2 looks at other potential 
measures of flexibility.  One is a Herfindahl index of export concentration.  The idea 
is that countries with more concentrated export sectors will have a harder time 
reacting to adverse shocks as it will be more difficult for other industries to expand.  
It is possible that open_forest is simply capturing the effects of having a diversified 
export structure.  The result shown in columns 2-4 are surprising: export 
concentration seems to be associated with a higher, not lower, probability of exiting 
the crisis.  A similar fact appears to be true about the log of population, another 
measure of the size of the economy and of its possible flexibility (column 3).  In any 
case, the coefficient on open forests is robust to the inclusion of these alternative 
indicators of flexibility, as well as of land area (column 4).  In column 5 we present 
an additional robustness test, which is to control for the magnitude of the initial crisis 
by introducing measures of the magnitude of the initial shock.  In particular, we 
control for initial and lagged GDP growth, initial and lagged export growth and the initial terms of trade shock.  Since some of these measures will be correlated with the 
dependent variable by definition, we do not use this set of controls more broadly in 
this paper.  Open_forest is robust to the inclusion of these controls.  
 
6.  Concluding Comments 
 
This paper has analyzed episodes during which economic growth decelerates to 
negative rates in a sample of 180 developing and developed economies. We identify 
535 episodes of output contractions.  The distribution of these episodes is highly 
skewed: while the median duration is 2 years, more than a quarter of them last more 
than 7 years and roughly 14% last more at least 15 years.  Developing countries are 
much more likely to experience prolonged contractions than industrial countries. 
We have studied the factors that coincide with the onset of these crises.  In terms 
of statistical significance, we find that the change in exports is the variable most 
strongly associated with the probability of suffering a crisis – at least in developing 
countries.  A one standard deviation decrease in the growth rate of merchandise 
exports implies a 5.47 percentage point increase in the probability of a crisis. In terms 
of economic significance, a one-standard deviation increase in inflation appears to be 
slightly more damaging, though the coefficient is somewhat less precisely estimated. 
Wars, sudden stops and political transitions also tend to coincide with the onset of 
crises. 
The duration of crisis is somewhat more difficult to predict.  Surprisingly, the 
variables that we find to be significantly associated with the probability of a crisis 
occurring do not appear to be related to crisis duration.  The main variable that we 
find to be robustly associated with crisis duration – aside from continent and decade 
effects - is a measure of the density-weighted value of a country’s alternative export 
basket suggested by Hausmann and Klinger (2006).  We take this measure to be an 
indicator of the flexibility of an economy’s productive apparatus to adapt to external 
shocks. This intuition is confirmed by case studies of collapse episodes in developing 
countries that emphasize the role that poor performance in the non-traditional export 
sector plays in deepening growth collapses
13. 
Our results leave open several avenues for future analysis.  On the one hand, it 
would be desirable to refine the predictive capacity of the duration model.  One 
possible avenue for doing this would be to adopt a model of time-varying covariates.  
We have shied away from that alternative because we find it easier to believe in the 
exogeneity of changes that took place before the onset of the crisis than we would in 
changes that occur during the crisis. Another avenue is to explore the possible 
channels through which open_forest is correlated with crisis duration.  Our first 
tentative attempts to get at this issue failed to find a significant interaction between 
export collapses and open_forest.  Several explanations could account for this fact.  
Open_forest may be a more general measure of the economy’s adaptability to several 
types of productivity shocks, a multiplicative interaction may be too coarse to capture 
generalized nonlinearities, or open_forest may be proxying for some unmeasured 
country specific effect.  Further research could help discern among these potential 
competing hypotheses. 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Hausmann and Rodríguez (2006) on Venezuela and Auty (2001) on Saudi Arabia. We also find that decreasing conditional and unconditional hazard rates are a 
pervasive characteristic of our estimation.  While this is not necessarily surprising for 
unconditional rates, as it may be a consequence of the changing composition of the 
population, it is definitely counterintuitive when these hazard rates are conditioned on 
estimated country frailties and covariates. Even though decreasing hazard rates can be 
accounted for within a neoclassical model as a result of substantial, permanent shocks 
to output, the depth and duration of some recessions in this sample appear hard to 
explain.  To take just one example, there is widespread agreement among many 
observers of the Bolivian economy that its institutional, political and macroeconomic 
framework was more solid at the beginning of this century than in the mid-
seventies.
14  However, GDP per working age person was 14.9% lower in 2004 than it 
was in 1978 despite the fact that world productivity surely increased during this 
period.  Further investigation of the characteristics of recessions may allow us to find 
ways to disentangle between alternative interpretations of this type of phenomenon. 
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Africa 151 8.14 10.09 1 1 3 13 43
Asia 42 4.79 5.71 1 1 2 7 24
Central and Eastern Europe 34 9.74 6.38 1 1 12.5 15 19
East Asia and Pacific 46 3.78 4.23 1 1 2 5 20
Industrialized 90 2.52 2.88 1 1 2 3 19
Latin America and Caribbean 109 6.88 8.92 1 1 3 7 34
Middle East and North Africa  63 5.13 7.56 1 1 2 4 27
Total 535 6.05 8.02 1 1 2 7 43
Peak to Through
Africa 151 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.19 0.95
Asia 42 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.52
Central and Eastern Europe 34 0.29 0.24 0.00 0.06 0.29 0.45 0.77
East Asia and Pacific 46 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.35
Industrialized 90 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.13
Latin America and Caribbean 109 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.62
Middle East and North Africa  63 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.91
Total 535 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.95
Product-Years lost (Integral)
Africa 151 1.42 2.94 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.93 16.40
Asia 42 0.51 1.16 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.26 5.51
Central and Eastern Europe 34 2.71 2.81 0.00 0.06 2.15 4.03 9.79
East Asia and Pacific 46 0.31 0.54 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.26 2.46
Industrialized 90 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 1.16
Latin America and Caribbean 109 1.05 2.35 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.62 13.78
Middle East and North Africa  63 1.16 2.88 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.20 12.73







Log-rank 54.49*** 33.78*** 21.31***
Cox 38.24*** 20.78*** 16.72***
Wilcoxon 37.36*** 20.05*** 17.84***
Tarone-Ware 45.38*** 25.95*** 19.82***
Peto-Peto 43.76*** 24.58*** 19.72***  Table 4: Random Effects Probit Regressions, All Countries
Dependent Variable: Probability of Falling into a Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP per Working Age Person -0.017 -0.007 -0.001 0.000 -0.004
(1.78)* (0.66) (0.06) (0.01) (0.17)
Latin America 0.473 0.495 0.551 0.215 0.223
(5.2)*** (5.34)*** (4.82)*** (1.15) (1.26)
Africa 0.565 0.488 0.430 -0.001 0.024
(6.69)*** (5.72)*** (4.17)*** (0.01) (0.1)
South and Central Asia 0.157 0.041 -0.109 -0.385 -0.381
(1.41) (0.35) (0.74) (1.83)* (1.98)**
East Asia and Pacific 0.188 0.160 0.162 -0.169 -0.175
(1.71)* (1.47) (1.17) (0.82) (0.91)
Central and Eastern Europe 0.274 -0.058 0.079 -0.132 -0.190
(2.19)** (0.3) (0.34) (0.32) (0.48)
Middle East and North Africa 0.475 0.515 0.432 0.122 0.108
(4.38)*** (4.73)*** (3.39)*** (0.54) (0.54)
1960s -0.088
(1.02)
1970s -0.050 0.184 0.287 0.482
(0.6) (1.86)* (2.23)** (1.43)
1980s 0.096 0.279 0.297 0.519 0.031
(1.17) (2.68)*** (2.63)*** (1.61) (0.22)
2000s -0.208 -0.052 -0.484
(1.98)** (0.42) (1.45)
1990s 0.112 0.107 0.391 -0.096
(1.05) (0.91) (1.22) (0.67)
Log Change in Real Merchandise Exports -0.266 -0.430 -0.422 -0.410
(4.03)*** (4.85)*** (3)*** (2.94)***
War 0.732 0.415 0.467
(3.66)*** (1.56) (1.81)*
Natural Disaster -0.037 0.063
(0.3) (0.37)
Sudden Stop 0.167 0.240 0.229
(2.19)** (2.36)** (2.27)**
Log of Inflation 1.017 1.020
(3.31)*** (3.35)***
Change in Polity Indicator 0.312 0.362
(2.45)** (2.92)***




Constant -1.173 -1.301 -1.366 0.370 1.068
(11.46)*** (10.82)*** (9.37)*** (0.29) (0.9)
ln(sigma^2  u) -4.424 -14.999 -15.000 -15.000 -15.000
(4.03)*** (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 3344 2785 1872 1054 1062
Countries 187 169 145 83 83
Percent crises predicted  0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 5.1% 6.1%
Pseudo-R^2 2.3% 3.8% 5.5% 7.4% 7.9%  Table 5: Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables, Baseline Estimation
dp/dx sd(x) (dp/dx)*sd(x)
Continuous variables
Log of per worker GDP -0.0009 3.4652 -0.0030
Log change in manufacturing exports -0.0960 0.5699 -0.0547
Lof(1+Inflation) 0.2385 0.3347 0.0798
Open Forest -0.0369 0.9898 -0.0366
Indicator variables
War 0.1336 0.1337 0.0179
Sudden Stops 0.0554 0.4374 0.0242
Political Transitions 0.0948 0.4416 0.0419
Latin America 0.0564 0.3864 0.0218
Africa 0.0057 0.4273 0.0024
Asia -0.0764 0.2587 -0.0198
East Asia and Pacific -0.0381 0.3307 -0.0126
Central and Eastern Europe -0.0402 0.3307 -0.0133
Middle East and North Africa 0.0264 0.2948 0.0078
1980s 0.0072 0.4163 0.0030
1990s -0.0221 0.4163 -0.0092
2000s -0.0881 0.3150 -0.0278  Table 6: Random Effects Probit Regressions, Industrialized Countries
Dependent Variable: Probability of Falling into a Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP per Working Age Person 0.040 0.043 0.044 0.065 0.066
(1.29) (1.32) (1.1) (1.03) (1.05)
Log Change in Real Merchandise Exports 0.039 -0.038 -0.409 -0.372
(0.18) (0.12) (0.92) (0.84)
War 0.775 0.789 0.725
(1.83)* (1.41) (1.35)
Natural Disaster -5.670 -5.403
(0) (0)
Sudden Stop 0.356 0.393 0.390
(2.44)** (2.04)** (2.04)**
1980s -0.061 0.016 0.025
(0.26) (0.05) (0.09)
1990s -0.367 0.290 0.260
(1.6) (0.9) (0.81)
2000s -0.390 -5.149 -4.993
(1.35) (0) (0)
Log of Inflation 11.554 10.982
(4.01)*** (4.03)***
Political Transitions 0.315 0.158
(0.53) (0.28)
Open Forest -0.124 -0.089
(0.38) (0.27)
Democracy (Polity Index) 0.316
(0.77)
Constant -1.550 -1.558 -1.405 -3.873 -1.220
(7.69)*** (6.82)*** (4.11)*** (0.64) (0.26)
log(sigma^2   u) -17.125 -17.125 -16.000 -15.000 -15.125
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 934 816 577 368 368
C o u n t r i e s 2 52 52 51 91 9
Percent crises predicted  0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 5.3% 6.6%
Pseudo-R^2 1.4% 3.4% 5.7% 7.3% 7.7%  Table 7: Random Effects Probit Regressions by intensity of crisis
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Duration<5 years Duration>5 years Integral<0.75 GDP-years
Integral>0.75 output 
years
Log GDP per Working Age Person 0.015 -0.030 0.010 -0.046
(0.58) (0.93) (0.41) (1.2)
Log Change in Real Merchandise Exports -0.295 -0.477 -0.379 -0.425
(1.9)* (2.25)** (2.49)** (1.84)*
War 0.431 0.400 0.347 0.614
(1.5) (1.04) (1.2) (1.51)
Sudden Stop 0.192 0.189 0.221 0.118
(1.73)* (1.14) (2.08)** (0.61)
Log of Inflation 0.806 0.972 0.897 0.897
(2.44)** (2.25)** (2.79)*** (1.9)*
Political Transitions 0.320 0.421 0.305 0.442
(2.27)** (2.32)** (2.29)** (2.09)**
Open Forest -0.043 -0.394 -0.004 -0.498
(0.43) (3.36)*** (0.04) (3.83)***
Latin America -0.045 0.742 0.142 0.874
(0.21) (2.47)** (0.73) (2.06)**
Africa 0.027 0.138 0.168 0.207
(0.1) (0.36) (0.63) (0.42)
South and Central Asia -0.368 -0.179 -0.262 -0.375
(1.75)* (0.49) (1.32) (0.66)
East Asia and Pacific -0.297 0.253 -0.176 0.454
(1.38) (0.73) (0.87) (0.97)
Central and Eastern Europe -0.316 0.425 -0.401 1.100
(0.72) (0.67) (0.91) (1.58)
Middle East and North Africa 0.160 0.167 0.203 0.216
(0.75) (0.45) (0.98) (0.43)
1970s 0.419
(1.25)
1980s 0.333 0.224 -0.064 0.284
(1.04) (1.01) (0.42) (1.16)
1990s 0.207 0.092 -0.101 -0.272
(0.65) (0.39) (0.68) (0.9)
2000s -5.143 -0.461 -4.943
(0) (1.37) (0)
Constant -1.071 3.288 -1.182 4.522
(0.72) (1.97)** (0.86) (2.42)**
lnsig2u -14.999 -15.000 -15.000 -15.000
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 1004 933 1023 921
C o u n t r i e s 8 18 38 18 3
Percent crises predicted  0.8% 2.0% 1.4% 2.6%
Pseudo-R^2 4.7% 20.4% 5.0% 26.8%
Dependent Variable: Probability 
of Falling into a Crisis
 Dependent Variable: Probability of Falling into a Crisis
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Log GDP per Working Age Person -0.002 -0.002 -0.017 -0.013
(0.1) (0.11) (0.72) (0.57)
Log Change in Real Merchandise Exports -0.401 -0.390 -0.338 -0.350
(2.88)*** (2.78)*** (2.2)** (2.29)**
War 0.456 0.457 0.535 0.562
(1.76)* (1.76)* (1.96)* (2.06)**
Sudden Stop 1 0.122
(1.07)
Log of Inflation 1.029 1.030 1.030 0.992
(3.39)*** (3.4)*** (3.3)*** (3.18)***
Political Transitions 0.359 0.351 0.360 0.360
(2.9)*** (2.83)*** (2.77)*** (2.77)***
Open Forest -0.156 -0.159 -0.186 -0.185
(1.86)* (1.9)* (2.13)** (2.11)**
Latin America 0.199 0.190 0.150 0.144
(1.13) (1.08) (0.82) (0.79)
Africa 0.025 0.021 -0.069 -0.088
(0.1) (0.09) (0.28) (0.36)
South and Central Asia -0.382 -0.389 -0.384 -0.395
(1.99)** (2.02)** (1.98)** (2.04)**
East Asia and Pacific -0.157 -0.148 -0.160 -0.184
(0.82) (0.78) (0.82) (0.94)
Central and Eastern Europe -0.235 -0.259 -0.160 -0.152
(0.59) (0.65) (0.46) (0.44)
Middle East and North Africa 0.091 0.076 0.069 0.042
(0.46) (0.38) (0.34) (0.21)
1970s 0.464 0.451 0.593
(1.4) (1.36) (1.64)
1980s 0.483 0.467 0.030 0.617
(1.52) (1.47) (0.2) (1.77)*
1990s 0.364 0.349 -0.122 0.486
(1.14) (1.1) (0.81) (1.39)
Sudden Stop 2 0.062
(0.64)




Sudden Stop 4 0.226
(1.95)*
Constant 0.626 0.684 1.538 0.968
(0.5) (0.54) (1.25) (0.74)
lnsig2u -15.000 -15.000 -15.125 -15.000
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 1061 1061 1004 1002
C o u n t r i e s 8 38 38 38 3
Percent crises predicted  0.0611 0.0556 0.0599 0.0539
Pseudo-R^2 0.0759 0.0752 0.0839 0.0846
Table 8: Random Effects Probit Regressions, Alternative Sudden Stop Definitions
 Table 9: Fixed Effects Logit Specification
Dependent Variable: Probability of Falling into a Crisis
Log GDP per Working Age Person -1.158 -1.308 -2.398 -3.792 -3.807
(3.83)*** (3.25)*** (3.63)*** (3.7)*** (3.71)***
Log Change in Real Merchandise Exports -0.452 -0.892 -1.277 -1.273
(3.21)*** (4.53)*** (4.13)*** (4.11)***
War 1.073 0.839 0.842
(2.93)*** (1.72)* (1.72)*
Natural Disaster 0.101 0.208
(0.4) (0.6)
Sudden Stop 0.396 0.528 0.528
(2.58)*** (2.55)** (2.55)**
Log of Inflation 1.293 1.291
(1.88)* (1.88)*






1980s -0.111 1.220 -0.210 0.579 0.587
(0.64) (4.54)*** (0.7) (1.98)** (2)**
1990s 1.248 -0.059 1.103 1.118
(3.82)*** (0.23) (2.7)*** (2.74)***
2000s -0.454 1.061 0.643 0.656
(2.01)** (2.74)*** (0.83) (0.84)
Observations 3273 2673 1766 986 986
Countries 180 149 125 75 75
Percent crises predicted  1.50% 1.80% 0.60% 2.24% 2.24%
Pseudo-R^2 1.30% 2.40% 5.25% 8.69% 8.69%  
 Table 10: Random Effects Probit 
Dependent Variable: Probability of Falling into a Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GDP per Working Age Person -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.017 0.000 -0.005 0.010 0.023
(0.23) (0.28) (0.22) (0.6) (0.01) (0.24) (0.27) (0.48)
Log Change in Real Merchandise  -0.507 -0.507 -0.510 -0.429 -0.420 -0.416 -0.477 -0.869
(3.06)*** (3.05)*** (3.07)*** (2.04)** (2.88)*** (2.97)*** (2.03)** (2.36)**
War 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.655 0.472 0.474 0.922 0.990
(2.78)*** (2.78)*** (2.78)*** (2.03)** (1.82)* (1.83)* (2.18)** (2.14)**
Sudden Stop 0.261 0.263 0.262 0.277 0.206 0.226 0.445 0.666
(2.44)** (2.46)** (2.45)** (2.06)** (2)** (2.24)** (2.94)*** (3.35)*
Log of Inflation 1.185 1.132 1.155 0.806 0.974 0.974 1.137 0.987
(3.71)*** (3.59)*** (3.66)*** (2.2)** (3.18)*** (3.13)*** (2.3)** (1.68)*
Change in Polity Indicator 0.298 0.304 0.299 0.543 0.331 0.370 0.035 -0.112
(2.14)** (2.18)** (2.15)** (3.2)*** (2.58)** (2.97)*** (0.15) (0.29)
Openforest -0.092 -0.106 -0.094 -0.039 -0.120 -0.177 -0.378 -0.261
(0.89) (1.03) (0.91) (0.28) (1.37) (2.01)** (2.29)** (0.92)
Years of Primary Schooling -0.039 0.010
(0.83) (0.02)
Latin America 0.203 0.215 0.190 0.655 0.119 0.229 -0.005 0.256
(1.04) (1) (0.92) (2.25)** (0.51) (1.29) (0.02) (0.41)
Africa -0.187 -0.139 -0.191 0.233 -0.147 0.087 -1.002 -1.150
(0.63) (0.45) (0.62) (0.57) (0.51) (0.34) (1.89)* (1)
South and Central Asia -0.448 -0.389 -0.447 -0.310 -0.534 -0.300 -0.834 -0.326
(1.94)* (1.63) (1.83)* (0.99) (2.02)** (1.33) (2.02)** (0.52)
East Asia and Pacific -0.152 -0.148 -0.171 -0.114 -0.288 -0.145 -0.340 -0.320
(0.75) (0.67) (0.8) (0.45) (1.2) (0.74) (1.04) (0.67)
Central and Eastern Europe -0.024 -0.116 -0.092 -0.070 -0.334 -0.147 -0.062 -0.346
(0.05) (0.26) (0.21) (0.16) (0.78) (0.37) (0.14) (0.45)
Middle East and North Africa -0.125 -0.104 -0.128 0.435 0.032 0.109 0.118 0.140
(0.53) (0.43) (0.54) (1.51) (0.13) (0.54) (0.33) (0.23)
1980s -0.007 -0.013 -0.008 0.140 0.058 0.026 0.651 0.041
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (1) (0.4) (0.19) (1.18) (0.18)
1990s -0.145 -0.156 -0.142 -0.028 -0.111 0.484           
(0.94) (1) (0.91) (0.18) (0.77) (0.89)
Years of Secondary Schooling -0.019 -0.104
(0.26) (0.2)




Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 pe -0.001 -0.002
(0.96) (1.24)
2000s -0.390 -0.499           
(1.13) (1.49)
Urban population (% of total)- WD 0.002 0.018
(0.67) (1.88)*
Life expectancy at birth, total (year -0.019 -0.035
(1.07) (0.9)
1970s 0.566           
(0.96)
Constant 0.380 0.457 0.384 -0.970 0.688 1.205 4.979 3.142
(0.27) (0.32) (0.27) (0.49) (0.57) (1.01) (2.16)** (0.72)
N 951 951 951 672 1037 1062 522 369
N _ g 7 4 7 47 46 18 08 37 75 0
Percent crises predicted  7% 7% 7% 7% 5% 6% 7% 6%
Pseudo-R^2 8% 8% 8% 10% 8% 8% 11% 13%   
Table 11: Characteristics of Crises by Coinciding 
Initial Events
Max Min
Substantial Change in Merchandise Exports 95 56 6.51 11.6% 0.98 1.1%
Wars 32 21 6.53 16.5% 1.50 2.1%
Natural Disasters 51 33 7.51 13.0% 1.30 1.0%
High Inflation 62 49 6.60 10.2% 0.97 1.7%
Political Transition 118 84 6.69 11.0% 1.04 1.7%
Sudden Stop 109 71 5.83 8.8% 0.86 1.6%








Lost Years of 
GDPTable 12: Duration Regressions, Weibull Specification with Frailty
Dependent Variable: Years in crisis.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Representation, Hazard rate with Region and Decade dummies (not shown)
Log GDP per Working Age Person 0.024 0.030 0.056 0.057 0.046 0.049 0.055
(1.2) (1.4) (1.21) (1.15) (0.75) (1.07) (1.1)
Openforest 0.533 0.558 0.712 0.438 0.494
(3.61)*** (3.13)*** (3.36)*** (2.49)** (2.36)**
Democracy (Polity Index) 0.031 0.028 0.032
(1.48) (1.07) (1.35)
Sudden Stop -0.092 -0.223
(0.45) (1)






Log of Inflation -0.262
(0.4)
Change in Polity Indicator -0.186
(0.65)
Change in Exports*Open Forest 0.136 0.104
(0.66) (0.38)




Constant -1.679 -0.796 -8.117 -8.982 -10.640 -6.859 -8.138
(11.74)*** (2.64)*** (3.89)*** (3.63)*** (3.3)*** (2.81)*** (2.82)***
N 535 535 233 191 175 230 191Table 13: Weibull Specification, Alternative Controls
Dependent Variable: Years in crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)                   (9)                  
Representation - Hazard                            
Log GDP per Working Age Person 0.055 0.114 0.090 0.044 0.062 0.005 0.048 0.098 0.226
(1.05) (2)** (1.78)* (0.94) (1.26) (0.07) (0.96) (1.78)* (1.64)
Openforest 0.517 0.547 0.564 0.572 0.633 0.631 0.537 0.547 1.119
(2.96)*** (2.98)*** (2.99)*** (3.49)*** (4)*** (2.43)** (3.25)*** (2.73)*** (2.42)**
Sudden Stop 4 -0.067                              
(0.31)
Latin America -1.512 -1.356 -1.251 -1.268 -1.293 -1.263 -1.265 -0.995 -1.464
(3.72)*** (3.52)*** (3.16)*** (3.48)*** (3.45)*** (1.79)* (3.39)*** (2.30)** (1.71)*
Africa -0.766 -0.513 -0.449 -0.777 -0.419 -0.465 -0.672 0.086 -2.440
(1.51) (1) (0.8) (1.78)* (0.91) (0.29) (1.46) -0.14 (1.54)
South and Central Asia -0.071 -0.211 0.054 -0.004 -0.190 -1.148 -0.080 -0.138 -1.729
(0.13) (0.41) (0.09) (0.01) (0.36) (1.13) (0.17) -0.23 (1.35)
East Asia and Pacific -0.276 -0.687 -0.135 -0.275 -0.444 -0.313 -0.288 -0.094 -1.580
(0.54) (1.34) (0.32) (0.62) (0.89) (0.45) (0.64) -0.17 (1.35)
Central and Eastern Europe -1.922 -2.183 -1.009 -1.052 -1.648 -1.744 -0.857 -1.189 -2.741
(2.62)*** (2.39)** (1.32) (1.28) (2.55)** (2.4)** (1.13) (2.01)** (1.97)**
Middle East and North Africa -0.301 0.072 -0.163 -0.143 -0.215 -1.093 -0.151 0.459 -1.459
(0.63) (0.15) (0.33) (0.32) (0.47) (1.48) (0.34) -0.83 (0.98)
1970s -1.293 0.513                -0.612 -0.273 0.429               
(1.73)* (1.7)* (0.95) (0.18) (1.48)
1980s -1.803 -0.874 -0.436 -0.749 -1.453 -1.415 -0.378 -0.603 -0.676
(2.57)** (3.42)*** (1.73)* (2.59)*** (2.46)** (0.95) (1.59) (2.09)** (1.49)
1990s -1.451 -0.531 -0.433 -1.148 -1.053 -0.478 -0.311
(2.03)** (1.92)* (1.32) (1.91)* (0.74) -1.55 (0.57)
2000s 0.443 0.986 0.397               
(0.39) (1.18) -0.48
Tariff Rate 6.008                14.763
(0.78) (0.36)
Total Years of Schooling 0.034                -0.104
(0.53) (1.04)
Liquid Liabilities/GDP 0.001 0.008
(0.2) (0.86)
Openness                0.002 0.006
(0.81) (0.65)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)-                -0.022 -0.036
(0.43) (0.38)




Constant -6.940 -8.733 -9.588 -8.719 -9.140 -7.288 -8.651 -8.745 -15.104
(2.65)*** (3.33)*** (3.6)*** (3.86)*** (3.72)*** (1.59) (3.57)*** (3.11)*** (2.68)***
N 190 177 179 191 224 100 183 182 60Table 14: Duration Regressions, Alternative Specifications
Dependent Variable: Years in crisis (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dsitribution Exponential Gompertz Cox Log-normal
Representation Hazard Hazard Hazard AFT
Log GDP per Working Age Person 0.054 0.040 -0.064 -0.082
(1.22) (1.26) (1.54) (1.79)*
Openforest 0.516 0.393 -0.328 -0.282
(3.7)*** (3.75)*** (2.45)** (1.94)*
Latin America -1.231 -0.913 0.548 0.549
(3.54)*** (3.52)*** (1.73)* (1.68)*
Africa -0.605 -0.449 0.156 0.230
(1.43) (1.55) (0.38) (0.53)
South and Central Asia -0.311 -0.365 -0.214 -0.262
(0.65) (1.13) (0.52) (0.65)
East Asia and Pacific -0.065 -0.089 -0.201 -0.145
(0.16) (0.3) (0.54) (0.41)
Central and Eastern Europe -1.456 -1.057 0.836 0.904
(2.74)*** (2.57)** (1.72)* (1.61)
Middle East and North Africa -0.227 -0.069 -0.154 -0.291
(0.54) (0.24) (0.43) (0.78)
1980s -0.790 -0.436 0.799 0.887
(3.35)*** (2.15)** (4.04)*** (4.53)***
1990s -0.525 -0.271 0.639 0.723
(2.06)** (1.2) (2.95)*** (3.42)***
2000s 0.657 0.917 0.033 0.122
(1.06) (1.61) (0.06) (0.25)
Constant -7.893 -6.240 5.234 4.549
(4)*** (4.24)*** (2.8)*** (2.23)**
N 233 233 233 233  Table 15: Duration Regressions, PWP Stratified Cox Model
Dependent Variable: Years in crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Representation, Hazard
Log GDP per Working Age Person 0.019 0.018 0.036 0.038 0.031 0.032 0.036
(1.51) (1.32) (1.38) (1.21) (0.89) (1.17) (1.12)
Latin America -0.797 -0.864 -0.601 -0.445 -0.895 -0.610
(5.11)*** (3.54)*** (2.14)** (1.55) (3.59)*** (2.09)**
Africa -0.979 -0.492 0.022 0.236 -0.565 -0.008
(6.38)*** (1.73)* (0.05) (0.47) (1.93)* (0.02)
South and Central Asia -0.548 -0.243 -0.081 -0.018 -0.258 -0.092
(3.13)*** (0.71) (0.23) (0.05) (0.76) (0.26)
East Asia and Pacific -0.376 -0.036 -0.071 0.068 -0.075 -0.067
(1.84)* (0.16) (0.24) (0.23) (0.32) (0.22)
Central and Eastern Europe -1.083 -0.764 -0.334 -0.384 -0.587 -0.282
(4.25)*** (2.72)*** (1.13) (1.03) (1.83)* (0.83)
Middle East and North Africa -0.473 -0.171 0.368 0.445 -0.174 0.341
(2.36)** (0.68) (1.08) (1.16) (0.68) (0.98)
1960s 0.866               
(3.32)***
1970s 0.329                -0.484
(1.26) (1.13)
1980s 0.124 -0.315 -0.211 -0.645 -0.318 -0.226
(0.5) (1.62) (0.9) (1.57) (1.46) (0.89)
1990s 0.091 -0.347 -0.178 -0.641 -0.315 -0.184
(0.38) (1.59) (0.76) (1.54) (1.35) (0.74)
2000s 0.841 0.554 0.840 0.529
(2.44)** (1.58) (2.38)** (1.39)
Open Forest 0.353 0.341 0.377 0.281 0.311
(3.21)*** (2.5)** (2.64)*** (2.09)** (1.92)*
Democracy (Polity) 0.022 0.027 0.020
(1.59) (1.51) (1.24)
Sudden Stop -0.016 -0.059 -0.039
(0.09) (0.32) (0.18)






Log of Inflation -0.279
(0.4)
Change in Polity Indicator -0.067
(0.28)
Change in Exports*Open Forest                0.098 0.080
(0.58) (0.35)
Polity*Change in Merchandise Exports                -0.006
(0.19)
Polity*Sudden Stops                0.007
(0.32)
N 535 535 233 191 175 230 191
Pseudo-R2 0.1% 2.2% 4.3% 4.2% 4.4% 3.9% 4.2%  Table 16: PWP Stratified Cox Model, Alternative Controls
Dependent Variable: Years in crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Representation, Hazard
Log GDP per Working Age Person 0.020 0.068 0.051 0.026 0.040 0.039 0.029 0.215
(0.51) (0.07) (0.14) (0.40) (0.17) (0.47) (0.41) (0.12)
Openforest 0.369 0.371 0.371 0.332 0.415 0.794 0.389 0.940
(2.74)*** (2.69)*** (2.15)** (2.47)** (3.63)*** (3.53)*** (2.64)*** (1.57)
Sudden Stop 4 -0.064                              
(0.39)
Latin America -1.015 -0.951 -0.812 -0.811 -0.921 -1.332 -0.801 -1.634
(3.41)*** (3.38)*** (2.79)*** (3.05)*** (3.65)*** (2.42)** (2.82)*** (1.6)
Africa -0.491 -0.421 -0.360 -0.535 -0.412 -1.505 -0.430 -3.318
(1.45) (1.17) (0.89) (1.68)* (1.4) (1.26) (1.25) (1.87)*
South and Central Asia -0.166 -0.271 -0.139 0.029 -0.198 -1.581 -0.134 -2.671
(0.48) (0.67) (0.34) (0.08) (0.56) (2.32)** (0.38) (1.86)*
East Asia and Pacific -0.202 -0.525 -0.043 -0.224 -0.286 -0.299 -0.161 -1.901
(0.75) (1.71)* (0.15) (0.9) (1.1) (0.63) (0.57) (1.31)
Central and Eastern Europe -1.179 -1.163 -0.453 -0.577 -0.850 -0.931 -0.347 -2.539
(2.99)*** (2.27)** (1.79)* (2.2)** (2.23)** (2.05)** (1.5) (2.21)**
Middle East and North Africa -0.168 0.016 -0.054 -0.050 -0.192 -0.770 0.005 -1.435
(0.51) (0.06) (0.14) (0.16) (0.77) (0.97) (0.02) (1.01)
1970s -1.212 0.329                -0.821 -0.935 0.269               
(2.76)*** (1.17) (2.23)** (1.11) (1.11)
1980s -1.301 -0.444 -0.139 -0.308 -1.169 -1.759 -0.137 -0.678
(3.7)*** (2.11)** (0.57) (1.41) (3.52)*** (2.42)** (0.64) (1.18)
1990s -1.173 -0.368 -0.195 -1.184 -1.469 -0.466
(3.02)*** (1.39) (0.65) (3.19)*** (2.11)** (0.7)
2000s 0.259 0.936               
(0.59) (2.07)**
Tariff Rate 6.978                15.316
(1.32) (0.42)
Total Years of Schooling 0.014                -0.142
(0.3) (1.7)*
Liquid Liabilities/GDP 0.002 0.006
(0.91) (0.79)
Openness                0.002 0.003
(1.15) (0.44)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)- -0.075 -0.082
(1.77)* (0.78)
Interaction between Polity and Terms of 0.086 0.456
(0.32) (0.5)
N 190 177 179 191 224 100 183 60
Pseudo-R2 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 8% 5% 12%  Table 17: Alternative Hypotheses (1)              (2)              (3)              (4)              (5)             
Log GDP per Working Age Person 0.056 0.057 0.056 0.057 0.28
(1.22)         (1.25)         (1.18)         (1.16)         (3.25)***
Open Forest 0.856
(2.58)***
Open Forest (Density Only) 0.581 0.935 1.25 1.264
(3.71)*** (3.68)*** (4.22)*** (4.03)***
Herfindahl 2.017 2.531 2.657
(1.81)* (2.21)** (2.21)**
Log of Population -0.199 -0.203
(2.30)** (2.05)**
Area (sq, km) 0.009
(0.13)        
Growth in Terms of Trade at t=1 7.254
(4.38)***
Growth in GDP at t=1 27.922
(4.48)***
Growth in Merchandise Exports at t=1 -0.882
(0.88)        
Growth in GDP at t=0 9.648
(1.43)        
Growth in Merchandise Exports at t=0 2.39
(2.35)**
Constant -2.708 -4.833 -3.232 -3.285 -14.82
(2.53)** (2.98)*** (1.84)* (1.79)* (2.97)***
Latin America -1.245 -1.315 -1.347 -1.361 -0.502
(3.37)*** (3.54)*** (3.55)*** (3.51)*** (0.79)        
Africa -0.593 -0.702 -0.371 -0.404 -0.063
(1.34)         (1.58)         (0.77)         (0.79)         (0.07)        
South and Central Asia -0.268 -0.266 0.254 0.26 -0.978
(0.53)         (0.54)         (0.45)         (0.44)         (1.28)        
East Asia and Pacific -0.04 -0.042 -0.046 -0.048 0.824
(0.09)         (0.10)         (0.10)         (0.11)         (1.15)        
Central and Eastern Europe -1.48 -1.457 -1.384 -1.327 -2.823
(2.62)*** (2.59)*** (2.38)** (2.18)** (2.87)***
Middle East and North Africa -0.19 -0.407 -0.371 -0.396 0.862
(0.42)         (0.89)         (0.79)         (0.82)         (1.18)        
1970s -0.789 -0.791 -0.788 -0.781 0.124
(1.26)         (1.28)         (1.28)         (1.26)         (0.14)        
1980s -1.568 -1.523 -1.561 -1.571 -0.442
(2.69)*** (2.61)*** (2.66)*** (2.67)*** (0.54)        
1990s -1.259 -1.169 -1.135 -1.131 -0.158
(2.11)** (1.96)* (1.89)* (1.88)* (0.19)        
Observations 233 233 233 229 130
Number of groups 102 102 102 99 62
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
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